News credibility and the quest for clicks

Kohei Kawamura, Mark T. Le Quement

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

We examine a model of dynamic communication by a media outlet. In each period, the uninformed public can consult the outlet’s report at a cost. The outlet, which is primarily driven by profit maximization, has an incentive to induce uncertainty in order to encourage future consultation and thereby generate revenue. In an intermediate cost range, the public and the outlet may be worse off with a cheaper cost of access since it leads the outlet to distort information more, by making the public’s future consultation decision more responsive to the current report.
Original languageEnglish
Article number105005
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume227
Early online date21 Oct 2023
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2023

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