On the Possibility of Price Wars When Firms Use a "Tit-for-Tat" Strategy

Paul Dobson; C. Donald Sinclair

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(90)90062-6

On the Possibility of Price Wars When Firms Use a "Tit-for-Tat" Strategy

Paul Dobson, C. Donald Sinclair

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how price wars can periodically occur in an industry even when all the firms behave cooperatively, and each firm has no intention of 'cheating' by attempting to undercut the other firms.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	115-119
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	32
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90062-6
Publication status	Published - Feb 1990

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10.1016/0165-1765(90)90062-6

Cite this

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