On the value of relative comparisons in firms

Abhijit Ramalingam

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.013

On the value of relative comparisons in firms

Abhijit Ramalingam

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a principal-agent model, we find that firms may not always benefit from the relative concerns of agents if such concerns are heterogeneous. Further, accounting for the influence of the environment on such concerns, profits are reduced relative to the no-comparisons benchmark.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	446-448
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	124
Issue number	3
Early online date	17 Jul 2014
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.013
Publication status	Published - Sep 2014

Keywords

Comparisons
Incentives
Context-dependence
Profits

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.013Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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title = "On the value of relative comparisons in firms",

abstract = "In a principal-agent model, we find that firms may not always benefit from the relative concerns of agents if such concerns are heterogeneous. Further, accounting for the influence of the environment on such concerns, profits are reduced relative to the no-comparisons benchmark.",

keywords = "Comparisons, Incentives, Context-dependence, Profits",

author = "Abhijit Ramalingam",

note = "{\textcopyright} 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). ",

year = "2014",

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AU - Ramalingam, Abhijit

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AB - In a principal-agent model, we find that firms may not always benefit from the relative concerns of agents if such concerns are heterogeneous. Further, accounting for the influence of the environment on such concerns, profits are reduced relative to the no-comparisons benchmark.

KW - Comparisons

KW - Incentives

KW - Context-dependence

KW - Profits

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.013

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.013

M3 - Article

VL - 124

SP - 446

EP - 448

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -