Perceived harmony, similarity and cooperation in 2 × 2 games: An experimental study

Daniel John Zizzo; Jonathan H. W. Tan

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2006.06.008

Perceived harmony, similarity and cooperation in 2 × 2 games: An experimental study

Daniel John Zizzo, Jonathan H. W. Tan

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Game harmony is a generic game property describing how conflictual or non-conflictual the interests of players are. Simple and general game harmony measures can predict mean cooperation in 2 × 2 games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Chicken and trust games. Two measures can be simply computed from monetary payoffs; another, the similarity index, can also be justified by theories of similarity-based reasoning. When data from Oxford and Frankfurt–Oder are disaggregated across experiments, countries and learning history, and when the similarity index is a valid measure, parsimonious regressions can explain around half of the variance in mean cooperation rates.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	365-386
Number of pages	22
Journal	Journal of Economic Psychology
Volume	28
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2006.06.008
Publication status	Published - Jun 2007

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10.1016/j.joep.2006.06.008

Cite this

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title = "Perceived harmony, similarity and cooperation in 2 × 2 games: An experimental study",

abstract = "Game harmony is a generic game property describing how conflictual or non-conflictual the interests of players are. Simple and general game harmony measures can predict mean cooperation in 2 × 2 games such as the Prisoner{\textquoteright}s Dilemma, the Chicken and trust games. Two measures can be simply computed from monetary payoffs; another, the similarity index, can also be justified by theories of similarity-based reasoning. When data from Oxford and Frankfurt–Oder are disaggregated across experiments, countries and learning history, and when the similarity index is a valid measure, parsimonious regressions can explain around half of the variance in mean cooperation rates.",

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