Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition Agencies

Daniel D. Sokol, Andreas Stephan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter identifies how developing world competition agencies can best prioritize cartel enforcement. Each jurisdiction will face a slightly different set of issues depending on its specific level of development and its socio-economic, legal and institutional endowments. Nevertheless, there are four key challenges facing most economies in transition: (1) an inability to challenge international cartels, which are potentially very damaging to developing economies; (2) obstacles to effective domestic enforcement, including the successful introduction of leniency, the imposition of penalties and the creation of competition and compliance cultures; (3) the danger of firms in concentrated markets colluding tacitly, so as to put their activities out of reach of anti-cartel enforcement and (4) collusion in public procurement, which may be particularly widespread.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCompetition Law and Development
EditorsDaniel D. Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng, Ioannis Lianos
PublisherStanford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780804785716
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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