Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

Wolfgang Luhan, Anders Poulsen, Michael Roos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)
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We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)687–699
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Early online date14 Mar 2017
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2017

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