Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

Wolfgang Luhan; Anders Poulsen; Michael Roos

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.016

Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

Wolfgang Luhan, Anders Poulsen, Michael Roos

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Abstract

We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	687–699
Number of pages	13
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	102
Early online date	14 Mar 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.016
Publication status	Published - Mar 2017

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10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.016

Accepted_manuscript_YGAME2659Accepted author manuscript, 1.15 MBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Anders Poulsen
- A.Poulsenuea.acuk
- School of Economics - Associate Professor
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Environment, Resources and Conflict - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research

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abstract = "We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior.",

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AB - We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior.

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Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

Abstract

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Anders Poulsen

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