Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

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Abstract

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)904-911
Number of pages8
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume29
Issue number6
Early online date7 Jun 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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