Abstract
How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley (Know how, 2011a, Ch. 8) offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 7-27 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 172 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 4 Jan 2014 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2015 |
Keywords
- Knowledge-how
- Knowledge-that
- Intentional action
- Luck