Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier

Yuri Cath

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

35 Citations (Scopus)


How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley (Know how, 2011a, Ch. 8) offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)7-27
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number1
Early online date4 Jan 2014
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2015


  • Knowledge-how
  • Knowledge-that
  • Intentional action
  • Luck

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