SCARKER: A sensor capture resistance and key refreshing scheme for mobile WSNs

Yi Ren; Vladimir A. Oleshchuk; Frank Y. Li; Selo Sulistyo

doi:10.1109/LCN.2011.6115207

SCARKER: A sensor capture resistance and key refreshing scheme for mobile WSNs

Yi Ren, Vladimir A. Oleshchuk, Frank Y. Li, Selo Sulistyo

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

How to discover a captured node and to resist node capture attack is a challenging task in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). In this paper, we propose a node capture resistance and key refreshing scheme for mobile WSNs which is based on the Chinese remainder theorem. The scheme is able of providing forward secrecy, backward secrecy and collusion resistance for diminishing the effects of capture attacks. By implementing our scheme on a Sun SPOT based sensor network testbed, we demonstrate that the time for updating a new group key varies from 56 ms to 546 ms and the energy consumption is limited to 16.5 - 225 mJ, depending on the length of secret keys and the number of sensors in a group.

Original language	English
Pages	271-274
Number of pages	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/LCN.2011.6115207
Publication status	Published - 29 Dec 2011
Event	2011 IEEE 36th Conference on Local Computer Networks - Duration: 4 Oct 2011 → 7 Oct 2011

Conference

Conference	2011 IEEE 36th Conference on Local Computer Networks
Period	4/10/11 → 7/10/11

Access to Document

10.1109/LCN.2011.6115207

Cite this

@conference{054fa0d5607b45208af92763969f53a5,

title = "SCARKER: A sensor capture resistance and key refreshing scheme for mobile WSNs",

abstract = "How to discover a captured node and to resist node capture attack is a challenging task in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). In this paper, we propose a node capture resistance and key refreshing scheme for mobile WSNs which is based on the Chinese remainder theorem. The scheme is able of providing forward secrecy, backward secrecy and collusion resistance for diminishing the effects of capture attacks. By implementing our scheme on a Sun SPOT based sensor network testbed, we demonstrate that the time for updating a new group key varies from 56 ms to 546 ms and the energy consumption is limited to 16.5 - 225 mJ, depending on the length of secret keys and the number of sensors in a group.",

author = "Yi Ren and Oleshchuk, {Vladimir A.} and Li, {Frank Y.} and Selo Sulistyo",

year = "2011",

month = dec,

day = "29",

doi = "10.1109/LCN.2011.6115207",

language = "English",

pages = "271--274",

note = "2011 IEEE 36th Conference on Local Computer Networks ; Conference date: 04-10-2011 Through 07-10-2011",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - SCARKER: A sensor capture resistance and key refreshing scheme for mobile WSNs

AU - Ren, Yi

AU - Oleshchuk, Vladimir A.

AU - Li, Frank Y.

AU - Sulistyo, Selo

PY - 2011/12/29

Y1 - 2011/12/29

N2 - How to discover a captured node and to resist node capture attack is a challenging task in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). In this paper, we propose a node capture resistance and key refreshing scheme for mobile WSNs which is based on the Chinese remainder theorem. The scheme is able of providing forward secrecy, backward secrecy and collusion resistance for diminishing the effects of capture attacks. By implementing our scheme on a Sun SPOT based sensor network testbed, we demonstrate that the time for updating a new group key varies from 56 ms to 546 ms and the energy consumption is limited to 16.5 - 225 mJ, depending on the length of secret keys and the number of sensors in a group.

AB - How to discover a captured node and to resist node capture attack is a challenging task in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). In this paper, we propose a node capture resistance and key refreshing scheme for mobile WSNs which is based on the Chinese remainder theorem. The scheme is able of providing forward secrecy, backward secrecy and collusion resistance for diminishing the effects of capture attacks. By implementing our scheme on a Sun SPOT based sensor network testbed, we demonstrate that the time for updating a new group key varies from 56 ms to 546 ms and the energy consumption is limited to 16.5 - 225 mJ, depending on the length of secret keys and the number of sensors in a group.

U2 - 10.1109/LCN.2011.6115207

DO - 10.1109/LCN.2011.6115207

M3 - Paper

SP - 271

EP - 274

T2 - 2011 IEEE 36th Conference on Local Computer Networks

Y2 - 4 October 2011 through 7 October 2011

ER -