“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang-Hyun Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)
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We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)486–493
Number of pages8
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Early online date3 Jun 2017
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2017


  • Contest design
  • Multiple winner
  • Group-size
  • Selection mechanism

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