“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury; Sang-Hyun Kim

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang-Hyun Kim

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

14 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	486–493
Number of pages	8
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	104
Early online date	3 Jun 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012
Publication status	Published - Jul 2017

Keywords

Contest design
Multiple winner
Group-size
Selection mechanism

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

Accepted manuscriptAccepted author manuscript, 285 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825617300969

Cite this

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AB - We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

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