Spoiling the broth? The impact of militia violence on peace negotiations

Political militias are active in most civil wars, yet their impact on peace processes is largely overlooked. Building on principal-agent logic, we argue that the incentives to delegate violence to political militias have downstream consequences for the likelihood of peace negotiations. On one hand, battlefield violence by militias can complicate the bargaining. On the other hand, the higher use of civilian victimization by political militias may backfire, eventually bringing international pressure on the unwilling parties to agree to talks. We combine data on peace negotiations between government-rebel dyads with data on militia activities in Africa. We find that militia violence against government and rebel forces is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of negotiations. When militias target civilians, however, mediated peace talks with third-party involvement become more likely. We complement these findings using fine-grained data in a focused case analysis of Sudan and South Sudan.