Strategically Equivalent Contests

Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, Roman M Sheremeta

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)
4 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)587-601
Number of pages15
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume78
Issue number4
Early online date17 May 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2015

Keywords

  • Rent-seeking
  • Contest
  • Equivalence
  • Contest design

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