Abstract
We consider three mechanisms for the aggregation of information in heterogeneous committees voting by Unanimity rule: Private Voting and voting preceded by either Plenary or Subgroup Deliberation. While the first deliberation protocol imposes public communication, the second restricts communication to homogeneous subgroups. We find that both protocols allow to Pareto improve on outcomes achieved under private voting. Furthermore, we find that when focusing on simple equilibria under Plenary Deliberation, Subgroup Deliberation Pareto improves on outcomes achieved under Plenary Deliberation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 155–186 |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 12 Feb 2015 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2015 |
Profiles
-
Mark Le Quement
- School of Economics - Associate Professor in Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
- Industrial Economics - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research