Supply chain coordination under discrete information asymmetries and quantity discounts

Dimitris Zissis, George Ioannou, Apostolos Burnetas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

77 Citations (Scopus)


We consider a two node supply chain with a rational manufacturer-retailer pair, in which the retailer has private information that affects the nodes' reservation levels. Quantity discounts offered by the manufacturer is the mechanism we propose in order to achieve reduced costs for both supply chain nodes. We derive analytical expressions of the quantity discounts that minimize the manufacturer's costs, while enabling the establishment of the business. Furthermore, we show that perfect coordination is possible even under asymmetric information. Sensitivity analysis and numerical examples offer evidence of the robustness of the results and of the potential of the approach for applications to real-life business ventures.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)21-29
Number of pages9
JournalOmega (United Kingdom)
Early online date27 Nov 2014
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2015
Externally publishedYes


  • Discrete asymmetric information
  • Game theory
  • Quantity discount
  • Reservation level
  • Supply chain management

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