That's the ticket: Explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests

Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Theodore Turocy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

Most laboratory experiments studying Tullock contest games find that bids significantly exceed the risk-neutral equilibrium predictions. We test the generalisability of these results by comparing a typical experimental implementation of a contest against the familiar institution of a ticket-based raffle. We find that in the raffle (1) initial bid levels are significantly lower and (2) bids adjust more rapidly towards expected-earnings best responses. We demonstrate the robustness of our results by replicating them across two continents at two university labs with contrasting student profiles.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)405–429
Number of pages25
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume88
Issue number3
Early online date14 Nov 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2020

Keywords

  • AVERSION
  • BEHAVIOR
  • CONFLICT
  • EQUILIBRIA
  • Experiment
  • Learning
  • Mechanism equivalence
  • RENT-SEEKING
  • Raffle

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