Abstract
Most laboratory experiments studying Tullock contest games find that bids significantly exceed the risk-neutral equilibrium predictions. We test the generalisability of these results by comparing a typical experimental implementation of a contest against the familiar institution of a ticket-based raffle. We find that in the raffle (1) initial bid levels are significantly lower and (2) bids adjust more rapidly towards expected-earnings best responses. We demonstrate the robustness of our results by replicating them across two continents at two university labs with contrasting student profiles.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 405–429 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Theory and Decision |
Volume | 88 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 14 Nov 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2020 |
Keywords
- AVERSION
- BEHAVIOR
- CONFLICT
- EQUILIBRIA
- Experiment
- Learning
- Mechanism equivalence
- RENT-SEEKING
- Raffle
Profiles
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Theodore Turocy
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Centre for Competition Policy - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
- Environment, Resources and Conflict - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research