The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders

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Abstract

Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)463-483
Number of pages21
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume52
Issue number2
Early online date29 Nov 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2023

Keywords

  • Communication
  • Externalities
  • Information
  • Polarization

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