Abstract
In June 2008 the European Commission adopted a system of direct settlement for cartel cases, inspired by a comparative glance across the Atlantic where the majority of antitrust defendants enter negotiated guilty pleas. Whereas settlements in Europe are viewed as a method for expediting the conclusion of cases (distinct from the leniency notice), in the US they complement the offer of immunity as a device for encouraging cooperation. In both jurisdictions they have the effect of reducing the levels of fines imposed. This paper compares how well the two systems fare at enhancing administrative efficiency and deterrence, while maintaining transparency.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 627-654 |
| Number of pages | 28 |
| Journal | International and Comparative Law Quarterly |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2009 |