Abstract
We test for a link between CEO power and risk-taking in US banks. Banks are more likely to take risks if they have powerful CEOs and relatively poor balance sheets. There is little evidence that executive board size and independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 101202 |
Journal | Finance Research Letters |
Volume | 33 |
Early online date | 4 Jun 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2020 |
Keywords
- Banks
- Boards of directors
- CEO power
- Governance
- Institutional investors
- Risk
Profiles
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Yurtsev Uymaz
- Norwich Business School - Associate Professor in Finance
- Finance Group - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research