The effect of voting rights on firm value

Cristina Mabel Scherrer, Marcelo Fernandes

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
12 Downloads (Pure)


We present a simple framework for dual‐class stock shares in which common shareholders receive public and private cash flows (i.e., dividends and any private benefit of holding voting rights) and preferred shareholders only receive public cash flows. We isolate these two cash flows in order to identify the role of voting rights on equity‐holders' wealth. In particular, using a structural cointegrated VAR model, we find a negative relationship between the value of the voting right and the preferred shareholders' wealth.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1106-1111
Number of pages6
JournalInternational Review of Finance
Issue number3
Early online date3 Jul 2020
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2021


  • dual-class shares
  • private benefits
  • voting right

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