Abstract
We present a simple framework for dual‐class stock shares in which common shareholders receive public and private cash flows (i.e., dividends and any private benefit of holding voting rights) and preferred shareholders only receive public cash flows. We isolate these two cash flows in order to identify the role of voting rights on equity‐holders' wealth. In particular, using a structural cointegrated VAR model, we find a negative relationship between the value of the voting right and the preferred shareholders' wealth.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1106-1111 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | International Review of Finance |
Volume | 21 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 3 Jul 2020 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2021 |
Keywords
- dual-class shares
- private benefits
- voting right