The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation

Sergio Beraldo; Robert Sugden

doi:10.1007/s11238-015-9514-z

The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation

Sergio Beraldo, Robert Sugden

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Abstract

We offer a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation when interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and evolution selects strategies according to material payoffs. The model has a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, but with an outside option of non-participation. The payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, it exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. Dynamic properties of the model are investigated theoretically and through simulations based on replicator dynamics.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	501–521
Number of pages	21
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume	80
Issue number	4
Early online date	18 Aug 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9514-z
Publication status	Published - Apr 2016

Keywords

cooperation
voluntary participation
random payoffs

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10.1007/s11238-015-9514-z

reciprocally beneficial cooperation final 150709Accepted author manuscript, 308 KB

Robert Sugden
- R.Sugdenuea.acuk
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Centre for Competition Policy - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research

Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science
Starmer, C., Turocy, T., Barr, A., Brown, G., Chater, N., Cubitt, R., Fatas, E., Gathergood, J., Gosling, S., Hargreaves-Heap, S., Lomes, G., MacKay, R., Poulsen, A., Read, D., Stewart, N., Sugden, R. & Zizzo, D.
Economic and Social Research Council
31/12/12 → 30/12/16
Project: Research

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title = "The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation",

abstract = "We offer a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation when interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and evolution selects strategies according to material payoffs. The model has a Prisoner{\textquoteright}s Dilemma structure, but with an outside option of non-participation. The payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, it exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. Dynamic properties of the model are investigated theoretically and through simulations based on replicator dynamics. ",

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AU - Sugden, Robert

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N2 - We offer a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation when interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and evolution selects strategies according to material payoffs. The model has a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, but with an outside option of non-participation. The payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, it exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. Dynamic properties of the model are investigated theoretically and through simulations based on replicator dynamics.

AB - We offer a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation when interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and evolution selects strategies according to material payoffs. The model has a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, but with an outside option of non-participation. The payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, it exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. Dynamic properties of the model are investigated theoretically and through simulations based on replicator dynamics.

KW - cooperation

KW - voluntary participation

KW - random payoffs

U2 - 10.1007/s11238-015-9514-z

DO - 10.1007/s11238-015-9514-z

M3 - Article

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SP - 501

EP - 521

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

SN - 0040-5833

IS - 4

ER -

The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation

Abstract

Keywords

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Robert Sugden

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Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science

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