Projects per year
Abstract
We offer a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation when interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and evolution selects strategies according to material payoffs. The model has a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, but with an outside option of non-participation. The payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, it exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. Dynamic properties of the model are investigated theoretically and through simulations based on replicator dynamics.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 501–521 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Theory and Decision |
Volume | 80 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 18 Aug 2015 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2016 |
Keywords
- cooperation
- voluntary participation
- random payoffs
Profiles
-
Robert Sugden
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Centre for Competition Policy - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research
Projects
- 1 Finished
-
Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science
Starmer, C., Turocy, T., Barr, A., Brown, G., Chater, N., Cubitt, R., Fatas, E., Gathergood, J., Gosling, S., Hargreaves-Heap, S., Lomes, G., MacKay, R., Poulsen, A., Read, D., Stewart, N., Sugden, R. & Zizzo, D.
Economic and Social Research Council
31/12/12 → 30/12/16
Project: Research