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The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
33 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We offer a new and robust model of the emergence and persistence of cooperation when interactions are anonymous, the population is well-mixed, and evolution selects strategies according to material payoffs. The model has a Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, but with an outside option of non-participation. The payoff to mutual cooperation is stochastic; with positive probability, it exceeds that from cheating against a cooperator. Under mild conditions, mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in equilibrium. This is possible because the non-participation option holds down the equilibrium frequency of cheating. Dynamic properties of the model are investigated theoretically and through simulations based on replicator dynamics.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)501–521
Number of pages21
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume80
Issue number4
Early online date18 Aug 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2016

Keywords

  • cooperation
  • voluntary participation
  • random payoffs

Access to Document

    • Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science

      Starmer, C. (Principal Investigator), Turocy, T. (Principal Investigator), Barr, A. (Co-Investigator), Brown, G. (Co-Investigator), Chater, N. (Co-Investigator), Cubitt, R. (Co-Investigator), Fatas, E. (Co-Investigator), Gathergood, J. (Co-Investigator), Gosling, S. (Co-Investigator), Lomes, G. (Co-Investigator), MacKay, R. (Co-Investigator), Poulsen, A. (Co-Investigator), Read, D. (Co-Investigator), Stewart, N. (Co-Investigator), Sugden, R. (Co-Investigator) & Zizzo, D. (Co-Investigator)

      Economic and Social Research Council

      31/12/12 → 30/12/16

      Project: Research

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