The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving

Enrique Fatas, Antonio J. Morales (Lead Author)

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
8 Downloads (Pure)


We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when they determine the voting outcome.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)179–200
Number of pages22
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number2
Early online date2 Jan 2018
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2018


  • Public goods
  • Voting
  • Joy of ruling

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