We use simple public goods games to investigate spousal behavior in Kano, northern Nigeria, one of the modern heartlands of polygyny. Most partners keep back at least half of their endowment from the common pool, but we find no evidence that polygynous households are less efficient than their monogamous counterparts. When men control the allocation, equal treatment of wives is common, but senior wives often receive more from their husbands, no matter what their contribution. However, the clearest result is that when men control the allocation, polygynous husbands receive a higher payoff compared to their wives and their monogamous counterparts.
- School of International Development - Professor of Economics
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- Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research - Member
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- Impact Evaluation - Member
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