The max-min group contest: Weakest-link (group) all-pay auction

Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, Dongryul Lee, Iryna Topolyan

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We investigate a group all-pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group-specific public good. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups. There are four types of equilibria: the pure strategy equilibria in which all (active) players exert the same effort; the semi-pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy; the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support; and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support. We then analyze a general contest with n groups.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)105-125
Number of pages21
JournalSouthern Economic Journal
Issue number1
Early online date9 Feb 2016
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2016


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