The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points

Andrea Isoni; Robert Sugden; Jiwei Zheng

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428

The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points

Andrea Isoni, Robert Sugden, Jiwei Zheng

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Abstract

We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and cooperation towards efficient outcomes. The experiment features the novel Pizza Night game, which can disentangle the effects of payoff inequality and conflict of interest. When coordination relies on focal points based on labelling properties, payoff inequality does not interfere with the successful use of those properties. When there are efficiency cues that assist coordination, payoff inequality is not an obstacle to the maximisation of efficiency. Conflict of interest is the main barrier to successful coordination.

Original language	English
Article number	103428
Journal	European Economic Review
Volume	127
Early online date	20 May 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428
Publication status	Published - Aug 2020

Keywords

Pizza Night game
tacit bargaining
conflict of interest
payoff inequality
focal points

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10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

ManuscriptAccepted author manuscript, 461 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND
AppendixAccepted author manuscript, 480 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND
Published_VersionFinal published version, 1.05 MBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001429212030060XLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Robert Sugden
- R.Sugdenuea.acuk
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Centre for Competition Policy - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research

Reconstructing normative economics on a foundation of mutual advantage
Sugden, R., Isoni, A. & Zheng, J.
EU Horizon 2020
1/01/16 → 30/06/21
Project: Research

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The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points

Abstract

Keywords

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Robert Sugden

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Reconstructing normative economics on a foundation of mutual advantage

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