Abstract
In explaining the winner's curse, recent approaches have focused on one of two cognitive processes: conditional reasoning and belief formation. We provide the first joint experimental analysis of the role of these two obstacles. First, we observe that overbidding decreases significantly between a simple common-value auction and a transformed version of this auction that does not require conditional reasoning. Second, assistance in belief formation leads to comparable behavioral changes in both games. The two effects are of similar magnitude and amplify each other when jointly present. We conclude that the combination and the interaction of the two cognitive processes in auctions lead to relatively low strategic sophistication compared to other domains. The study's focus on games' objective cognitive challenges is potentially useful for improving predictions across games and complements the common focus on behavioral models and their explanatory power.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 57–102 |
Number of pages | 46 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 174 |
Early online date | 7 Dec 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2018 |
Keywords
- Auctions
- Winner's curse
- Conditional reasoning
- Beliefs
Profiles
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Stefan Penczynski
- School of Economics - Associate Professor in Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research