Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions

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Abstract

Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve to a grain to which we are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so, we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)105-125
Number of pages21
JournalReview of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume7
Issue number1
Early online date6 May 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2016

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