Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

Emiliya Lazarova; Peter Borm; Arantza Estévez-Fernández

doi:10.1007/s11238-015-9524-x

Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

Emiliya Lazarova, Peter Borm, Arantza Estévez-Fernández

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10 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractual exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensational exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	53-71
Number of pages	19
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume	81
Issue number	1
Early online date	28 Nov 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9524-x
Publication status	Published - Jun 2016

Keywords

matching
Pareto optimal matching
contractual exchange stability
compensational stability
compensation schedule

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10.1007/s11238-015-9524-xLicence: CC BY

Lazarova et al
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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Emiliya Lazarova
- E.Lazarovauea.acuk
- School of Economics - Professor in Economics
- Applied Econometrics And Finance - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research

Cite this

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abstract = "In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractual exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensational exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.",

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KW - compensation schedule

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Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

Abstract

Keywords

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Emiliya Lazarova

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