Abstract
Analogical reasoning is often employed in problem-solving and metaphor interpretation. This paper submits that, as a default, analogical reasoning addressing these different tasks employs different mapping strategies: In problem-solving, it employs analogy-maximising strategies (like structure mapping, Gentner & Markman 1997); in metaphor interpretation, analogy-minimising strategies (like ATT-Meta, Barnden 2015). The two strategies interact in analogical reasoning with conceptual metaphors. This interaction leads to predictable fallacies. The paper supports these hypotheses through case-studies on ‘mind’-metaphors from ordinary discourse, and abstract problem-solving in the philosophy of mind, respectively: It shows that (1) default metaphorical interpretations for vision- and space-cognition metaphors can be derived with a variant of the analogy-minimising ATT-Meta approach, (2) philosophically influential introspective conceptions of the mind can be derived with conceptual metaphors only through an analogy-maximising strategy, and (3) the interaction of these strategies leads to hitherto unrecognised fallacies in analogical reasoning with metaphors. This yields a debunking explanation of introspective conceptions.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 211-243 |
Number of pages | 33 |
Journal | Connection Science |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 19 Jul 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2018 |
Profiles
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Eugen Fischer
- School of Politics, Philosophy and Area Studies - Professor of Experimental Philosophy
- UEA Experimental Philosophy Group - Member
- Philosophy - Member
- Wittgenstein - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research