Using team discussions to understand behavior in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games

David J. Cooper; John H. Kagel

Using team discussions to understand behavior in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games

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Abstract

We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices, and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (1) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (2) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams’ decision making. (3) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate.

Original language	English
Journal	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Early online date	Dec 2022
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - Dec 2022

Keywords

Infinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games
team decision making
analysis of team discussions

Access to Document

Cooper and Kagel, Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in IRPD Games, June 2022Accepted author manuscript, 1.55 MB

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210012

Cite this

@article{1b4329516e3c4edf8f9da5cbeb2830fa,

title = "Using team discussions to understand behavior in indefinitely repeated prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma games",

abstract = "We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices, and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (1) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (2) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams{\textquoteright} decision making. (3) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate. ",

keywords = "Infinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, team decision making, analysis of team discussions",

author = "Cooper, {David J.} and Kagel, {John H.}",

note = "Funding information: Financial support was partially provided by NSF grants SES 1630288, SES 1630194, SES 2018704 and SES 2018690. Opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations offered here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.",

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journal = "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics",

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AU - Kagel, John H.

N1 - Funding information: Financial support was partially provided by NSF grants SES 1630288, SES 1630194, SES 2018704 and SES 2018690. Opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations offered here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

PY - 2022/12

Y1 - 2022/12

N2 - We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices, and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (1) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (2) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams’ decision making. (3) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate.

AB - We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices, and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (1) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (2) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams’ decision making. (3) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate.

KW - Infinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games

KW - team decision making

KW - analysis of team discussions

M3 - Article

JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

SN - 1945-7669

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