Varying experimental instructions to improve comprehension: punishment in public goods games

Abhijit Ramalingam, Antonio J. Morales, James M. Walker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)
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We provide evidence that more explicit instructions can affect behaviour in a public goods game with punishment. Instructions that highlight the positive externality associated with public goods contributions and provide more examples improve subjects’ comprehension levels, as measured by shorter decision times in the experiment. They also lead to higher contribution levels in games with punishment opportunities, linked to better targeting of punishment.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)66-73
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Early online date7 Feb 2018
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2018


  • public goods
  • experiment
  • instructions
  • contributions
  • punishment
  • methodology

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