Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol

Daniel Cardona, Arnold Polanski

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


We analyze a rent-seeking contest that determines the bargaining protocol in a onedimensional bargaining game where agents preferences over social outcomes are single-peaked. We relate the incentives of the agents to make unproductive and costly efforts/investments to the quota rules that are required to implement agreements. When the contest assigns persistent recognition probabilities, we find that simple majority reduces the total investments and, hence, inefficiency. In case that the contest recurs each period, multiple equilibria are obtained, with the particularity that only one agent controls the agenda of the bargaining process.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)217-240
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Cite this