Wittgenstein's Distinction between Saying and Showing

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Abstract

Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing has caused significant headache to his readers and resisted attempts to explain it. The goal of this essay is to articulate a new perspective on the saying-showing distinction, and by so doing help to solve the interpretational and philosophical problems relating to Wittgenstein’s distinction.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationWittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
EditorsAndreas Georgallides
PublisherCambridge Scholars
Chapter5
Pages61-77
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)978-1-5275-7352-9
Publication statusPublished - 29 Sep 2021

Keywords

  • Wittgenstein
  • Tractatus
  • Saying
  • Showing
  • Logic

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