Abstract
This chapter discusses Wittgenstein's early account of the epistemology of logic in relation to Frege, Russell, and Carnap. It explains how Wittgenstein's early key insight that 'logic takes care of itself' enables him to solve several problems that arise for Frege's and Russell's philosophies and epistemologies of logic. These include problems relating to the justification of logical accounts and logical consequence, as well as to the status of logic as an a priori investigation distinct from empirical psychology. More specifically, Wittgenstein's key insight eliminates the need to appeal in logic to any allegedly self-evident truths, intuitions, or substantial metaphysical knowledge regarding abstract objects. Further, his associated conception that the right way to articulate an account of logic isn't theses, but a logical language whose design mirrors the logical structure of thought and language, puts him in a position to address what Sheffer later called 'the logocentric predicament'. I conclude by explaining why the Tractatus doesn't suffer from a paradox of nonsensical theses, and by outlining how Wittgenstein's use of colloquial language to introduce his logical language foreshadows Carnap's method of logical syntax. This explains why Carnap's criticisms of Wittgenstein fail.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Wittgenstein's Tractatus at 100 |
Editors | Martin Stokhof , Hao Tang |
Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
Chapter | 978-3-031-29862-2 |
Pages | 35–56 |
Number of pages | 22 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-031-29863-9 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-3-031-29862-2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 23 Sept 2023 |