You are not in my boat: Common fate and discrimination against outgroup members

Daniel John Zizzo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)


Sharing a common fate with some people but not others may affect how economic agents behave in economic transactions, quite independently of strategic incentives. We present an experimental test of the effect of perceptions of common fate on the inducement of economic discrimination in bilateral settings. In settings where the bargaining power was all with one subject (the dictator game and a ‘unilateral power game’), about half of the subjects engaged in negative discrimination: insiders were not treated better relative to control sessions, but outsiders were treated worse. Discrimination may be induced by a more conflictual perception of the decision problem.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)91-103
Number of pages13
JournalInternational Review of Economics
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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